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Making Decisions about 
the Future
Regret and the Cognitive Function 
of Episodic Memory
C H R I S T O P H  H O E R L  A N D  T E R E S A  M C C O R M A C K  ■
Episodic memory is the capacity to consciously recollect particular events from 
one’s own past (Hoerl, 2007; Tulving, 1985). Empirical work in psychology suggests 
that it is a fairly sophisticated memory capacity that may develop later than other 
memory and learning abilities (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999) and that can be selec-
tively impaired in amnesia (Squire & Zola, 1998). It is also often held to be unique 
to humans (Hoerl, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2002)— echoing 
the long- standing philosophical trope that animals’ lives are in some sense con-
fined to the present (Aristotle, 1930; Bennett, 1964; Bergson, 1991; Nietzsche, 1983; 
Schopenhauer, 1999)— although there is considerable debate about this in compar-
ative psychology. Existing discussions of episodic memory in philosophy are typi-
cally concerned with the idea that episodic recollection involves being in a distinct 
kind of epistemic state (Martin, 2001; Soteriou, 2008) and a state with a distinct kind 
of phenomenology (Hoerl, 2001; Hopkins, forthcoming). In both disciplines, the 
question as to what episodic memory is for— what distinctive evolutionary function 
it might serve— has, until relatively recently, rarely been asked (Baddeley, 1988), but 
is now becoming a very lively area of debate (Boyer, 2008; Klein, 2013; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007). In fact, this question has arguably emerged as one of the most 
significant challenges for memory research. While learning about the general char-
acteristics of the world (and retaining such information for future use) is clearly 
beneficial, of what benefit is it to the individual to be able to remember particular 
past events as such, given that those particular events will never come again?
This chapter will consider an approach to this issue that has not yet been explored, 
by examining how the set of cognitive abilities employed in episodic memory 
might be necessary for the emotion of regret. Regret, at least as we will under-
stand this notion in the context of the present chapter, is by definition an emotion 
directed toward the past:  one regrets a choice one has made, typically believing 
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that if one had chosen differently a better outcome would have obtained. However, 
although when we experience regret it is directed toward the past, psychologists 
have argued that this emotion has an important effect on our future lives (Roese, 
2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Having experienced regret over a choice, we may 
choose differently when faced with a similar choice again. Moreover, when making 
choices, we may anticipate and seek to avoid future regret.1 What we will explore 
in this chapter is the role of episodic memory in regret, and hence future- oriented 
decision- making itself.
As we see it, a key advantage of exploring this issue is that it may make vivid 
how episodic memory, which itself is intrinsically backward- looking, may never-
theless play a vital role in shaping our decisions about the future. In the first section, 
we set up the puzzle of accounting for a distinctive function for episodic memory 
in future- oriented decision- making. Recent accounts of the function of episodic 
memory have sought to identify a role for it in such decision- making, but, as we 
show in the next section, it is not clear how the accounts that have been put forward 
so far include the backward- looking element that is an essential aspect of episodic 
memory. In the second section, we will consider psychological research that has 
demonstrated the different ways in which regret may inform decision- making, dis-
tinguishing between the effects of experiencing versus anticipating regret. Finally, 
we will then consider how experiencing and anticipating regret may be connected 
to mental time travel, and whether episodic memory can be seen to be essential in 
supporting the way of thinking about time that is involved in regret. Our argument 
will be that episodic memory, because of its backward- looking element, underpins 
the ability to experience regret, and that this an important way in which episodic 
memory impacts on and supports adaptive future- oriented decision making.
1.  F INDING A DISTINCTIVE ROLE FOR  
EPISODIC MEMORY IN FUTURE-  ORIENTED  
DECISION- MAKING: THE BASIC PUZZLE
Having originally been conceived of in relative isolation from other cognitive abili-
ties, episodic memory has in recent years been re- conceptualized as one aspect of 
the more general capacity for engaging in what is sometimes referred to as “mental 
time travel” (Schacter & Addis, 2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007). This 
has been partly in response to the growing recognition that there is also a distinc-
tive, episodic way of thinking about future events (Atance & O’Neill, 2001), and 
in response to evidence from imaging studies and studies of cases of amnesia that 
such episodic future thinking relies on the same brain network as episodic mem-
ory (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). However, part of the motivation behind it 
has also been the thought that the function of episodic memory must ultimately 
turn on its connection to the ability to engage in episodic future thinking, and the 
role that the latter plays in enabling certain forms of planning or decision- making 
(Klein, 2013). The basic line of thought here is that, although it stems from the past, 
episodic memory is primarily useful not because it is about the past, but because it 
allows us to prepare adaptively for what is to come (Klein, forthcoming).
One problem, though, with this general line of argument is that it threatens 
to do away with any distinctive function for specifically episodic memory (by 
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contrast to other types of memory) in our mental lives. Indeed, a consideration 
of this line of argument can serve to demonstrate what the problem of account-
ing for the function of episodic memory comes to. To illustrate this, we will focus 
on one particularly persuasive and influential claim that has been made about the 
role of episodic memory, and episodic thinking more generally, in future- oriented 
decision- making: that of Boyer (2008). Recent accounts of episodic future think-
ing often emphasize that it is a type of mental simulation; the typical claim in the 
literature is that this simulation involves the flexible recombination of material 
from episodic memories of past experiences (Eacott & Easton, 2012; Suddendorf & 
Redshaw, 2013). Boyer’s (2008) claim is that episodic memory is critical for future- 
oriented decision- making, insofar as it supports the mental simulation of future 
events that allows us to give due weight to the future rather than current benefits 
of certain choices.
The paradigmatic decision- making scenario envisaged in this context is one that 
involves delayed gratification. Boyer argues that episodic memory allows simula-
tion of the future, and in virtue of this property it is has a special link to the emo-
tions: he states that the episodic system results in the generation of “emotions that 
bypass current goals as well as time discounting and, therefore, provide us with 
immediate counter- rewards against opportunistic motivation” (Boyer, 2008, 222). 
That is, insofar as the episodic system yields mental simulation of possible future 
events, it preferentially supports choices that may currently seem unattractive 
or have no immediate benefits but that are in the long term advantageous. This 
argument is on the face of it persuasive, because it focuses not just on the type 
of information about the world that the episodic system could deliver, but on the 
distinctive way in which this information is delivered, namely as input into a type 
of simulation.
Boyer focuses particularly on the idea that such simulation delivers a preview 
of a future emotional reward (see also Benoit et al., 2011). However, in virtue of 
the fact that it involves mentally “pre- experiencing” the future, it is plausible that 
episodic future thinking may also impact on other factors that are already known 
to affect temporal discounting, but which have not typically been explicitly linked 
to episodic thinking as such. Two examples of such factors are subjective temporal 
distance (Kim & Zauberman, 2009, 2013; Kim, Zauberman, & Bettman, 2012) and 
level of connectedness to one’s future self (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Hershfield, 2011). 
Kim and Zauberman (2009) argue that the extent to which one discounts a future 
event is closely linked to how far away in the future it feels; a natural extension of 
this suggestion is that simulation of the future underpinned by the episodic mem-
ory system might reduce subjective temporal distance to the future and thus reduce 
temporal discounting. Similarly, Bartels and Rips (2010) argue that individuals feel 
to varying degrees psychologically connected to their future selves (e.g., oneself 
in the distant future may be represented as only partially overlapping with one’s 
current self), and that this can help explain the typical temporal discounting func-
tion. Again, a plausible hypothesis is that episodic simulation may alter psycho-
logical connectedness to one’s future self and may thus support future- oriented 
decision- making.
Not only are there good reasons to hypothesize that mentally simulating the 
future will lead to it being more valued, empirical studies have begun to emerge 
demonstrating that encouraging people to simulate the future impacts on the 
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extent to which it is discounted (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; Lin & Epstein, 
2014; Peters & Buchel, 2010, 2011). The crucial question in the current context, 
though, is whether this can be used to support the idea that it is specifically episodic 
memory that does some crucial work in decision- making that involves simulation 
in this way. Mental simulation, of the type envisaged, clearly relies on past experi-
ence; even when we simulate a novel type of event, we can only do so to the extent 
that the elements out of which our simulation is composed correspond to experi-
ences with which we are familiar (Lewis, 1990). In that sense, information that is in 
memory as a result of our own past experiences must play an important role in sup-
porting simulation of the future. Yet, this does not mean that simulation requires 
that we can actually recall the particular past occasions on which we had those 
experiences (Hoerl, 2014). We may engage in such simulation, drawing on infor-
mation from memory, without actually casting our minds back to our past at all. 
Indeed, from an adaptive point of view, engaging in recollection in the context of 
this type of decision- making can put us at a disadvantage (see also Schacter, Benoit, 
De Brigard, & Szpunar, 2015, for this point), given that drawing on memories of 
particular past events in predicting the future introduces systematic biases— when 
casting our mind back to the past, instead of remembering how things typically go, 
we in fact tend to remember occasions that were atypical (Morewedge, Gilbert, & 
Wilson, 2005).
What these considerations illustrate is that there is an obvious function that 
memory can play in decision- making in cases where the choice is between outcomes 
of a type one has already encountered. In such cases, memory can provide the nec-
essary materials for simulating the future. But for memory to serve that function, 
the relevant memory does not need to include the capacity to recollect particular 
past events per se.2 The basic problem here is that once the primary function of 
episodic memory is thought to be one of serving future- oriented decision- making, 
it becomes difficult to see why this type of memory, with its backward- looking ele-
ment, should be seen to play a distinctive role in serving this function that cannot 
also be served by types of memory that do not include this element.
At the risk of laboring the point, the structure of the problem in accounting 
for a distinctive role for episodic memory could be put as follows. One approach 
to establishing a distinctive role for episodic memory in our mental lives would 
be to try to identify a type of information about past events that could only be 
yielded by episodic memory. For example, one might argue that episodic memory 
brings with it information about the spatiotemporal context in which remem-
bered events occurred (see McCormack, 2001, for discussion). However, the 
immediate difficulty that arises is that any such information one might try to 
home in on that might become useful again in the future (including information 
about the context in which an event occurred) could in principle be supplied by 
other types of memory (Klein, 2013, forthcoming). Presumably for this reason, 
researchers trying to account for the function of episodic memory have instead 
typically turned to focus on the way in which episodic memory delivers infor-
mation about the past, highlighting its distinctive phenomenology that involves 
“re- experiencing” events (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007). They suggest that 
episodic future thinking has a parallel type of phenomenology: we simulate the 
future and as a result “pre- experience” it. The idea is then that episodic memory 
may play some special role in supporting such simulations (for example, the title 
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of Schacter et al.’s, 2007, paper is “Remembering the Past to Imagine the Future”). 
This line of thought can also be seen to underpin Boyer’s description of why epi-
sodic memory helps with future- oriented decision- making. But the problem with 
this suggestion is that it is not clear why the information used in such simulations 
need derive specifically from recollecting particular past events. Why should epi-
sodic memory, with its backward- looking element, be what is required for simu-
lation of the future?
There are two immediately obvious responses to this puzzle, both of which have 
been put forward by Stanley Klein. One response here would be to bite the bullet 
and hold that there is indeed nothing distinctive about the function of episodic 
memory in this regard. Klein (2013, forthcoming) recognizes the puzzle when he 
argues that episodic memory is not necessary for future mental time travel, sug-
gesting on empirical and theoretical grounds that purely semantic memory might 
be not only necessary but also sufficient even for the type of mental simulation 
that is typically thought to accompany future mental time travel. The other, not 
incompatible, response would be to deny that we should place any special weight 
on the backward- looking element of episodic memory. So, for example, Klein (2014; 
Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2010, 2011) argues that even episodic memory should 
be viewed primarily as future- oriented, with its backward- looking element merely 
an evolutionary byproduct of a system that evolved to help us anticipate the future 
(though see Klein, forthcoming, for a somewhat different evolutionary explanation 
of the backward- looking element of episodic memory).
We agree with Klein’s (2013, forthcoming) assessment that some sorts of future- 
oriented thinking and decision- making need not necessarily involve episodic mem-
ory, and that there is empirical evidence to support this assessment. For example, 
we have been considering Boyer’s (2008) hypothesis that the episodic system may 
play a special role in the paradigmatic case of decision- making that involves tempo-
ral discounting. But, in experimental settings, amnesic patients who lack episodic 
memory for the past are not more inclined to discount the future than healthy 
controls (Kwan, Craver, Green, Myerson, & Rosenbaum, 2013). This suggests that 
if Boyer (2008) is correct that temporal discounting is affected by the ability to 
imagine the future, it is a type of imagination that does not rely on being able to 
recollect the past.3
However, we believe that, even if it is true that the adaptive function of episodic 
memory ultimately lies with the role it plays in future- oriented decision- making, 
there may be ways of fleshing out this thought that also recognize the importance 
of its backward- looking element. The challenge is to consider whether there are 
aspects of future- oriented decision- making that do seem to require a type of mental 
simulation that is itself intrinsically bound up with a capacity to recollect one’s past 
(i.e., that have what we termed a backward- looking element). In the next section, we 
will argue that experiencing and anticipating the emotion of regret play a crucial 
role in future- oriented decision- making. One of the defining features of regret is 
its backward- looking nature: by necessity, one can only regret what is in the past 
(although, as will be discussed, one may anticipate future regrets). Nevertheless, 
there are good reasons to believe that regret shapes our future behavior. A consid-
eration of regret provides an alternative way of thinking about how episodic mem-
ory might play an essential role in future- oriented decision- making, not despite its 
backward- looking element but because of it.
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2.  REGRET AND DECISION- MAKING
The idea that regret plays an important role in decision- making has gained much 
currency over the last two decades (for reviews, see Koch, 2014; Roese, 2005; 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Regret is typically defined within the psychological 
literature as the negative emotion that one feels when one realizes or believes that 
an outcome could have been better if one had chosen differently. In psychology, the 
term regret is typically reserved for cases in which one had responsibility for the 
choice and hence the outcome (Weisberg & Beck, 2012; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & 
Manstead, 1998, 2000; though see Ordóñez & Connolly, 2000). It has been shown 
to be an extremely common emotion; for example, one study (Shimanoff, 1984; 
see also Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008)  indicated that it was the most fre-
quent negative emotion mentioned in everyday conversation— and one that has far- 
reaching effects on our behavior (Roese, 2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007).
One way to argue for a close relation between regret and future- oriented decision- 
making might be to point to its close relation with agency and personal responsi-
bility: indeed, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) argue that regret is the only negative 
emotion that has a special relation with one’s own choices, such that it is only expe-
rienced if one believes one has made a poor or suboptimal choice. However, for 
present purposes we want to focus on the temporal character of regret. Zeelenberg 
and Pieters (2007, 8) capture this character in their claim that “[r] egret bridges the 
past and the future in the present.” What they mean by this is that although regret 
is experienced in the present, it is always past- directed; at the same time, although 
regret is directed toward our past, it has the capacity to exert a strong influence on 
our future.
Regret researchers typically distinguish between two broad ways in which regret 
may affect future decisions: through experienced regret or anticipated regret. In the 
former case, experiencing regret about a choice might have a subsequent effect on 
what one decides to do when faced with that decision again. In the case of antici-
pated regret, the basic idea is that, when faced with a choice, one anticipates the 
regret that might result as a consequence of one’s different choice options, and this 
guides the choice that one makes. In both cases, regret is assumed to affect behav-
ior primarily as a result of regret aversion (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, 
Beattie, van der Pligt, & deVries, 1996), that is, because people attempt to avoid 
feeling regret and take steps to regulate the emotion when they do experience it 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007).
Turning first to the case of experienced regret, studies suggest that experienc-
ing regret may impact on subsequent decision- making because, following a poor 
decision that one regrets, one may make a better choice the next time one is faced 
with the same type of decision (O’Connor, McCormack, & Feeney, 2014; Ratner & 
Herbst, 2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). In this way, regret may have an impact 
on choices that are encountered repeatedly (e.g., whether to hit the snooze but-
ton when the alarm clock goes off, or whether to eat the large slice of chocolate 
cake). O’Connor et al. (2014) demonstrated the effect of experienced regret in a 
developmental study by showing that children who experienced regret about a 
simple choice (which of two boxes to pick in order to win a prize) were more likely 
to switch choices when faced with the same decision again than children who did 
not experience this emotion. In this way, regret can be seen as a functional or 
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useful emotion that helps us to learn and adjust our behavior adaptively (Roese & 
Summerville, 2005). In O’Connor et al.’s (2014) terms, experiencing regret facili-
tates “adaptive switching.”
However, there may be other circumstances in which the experience of regret has 
an impact, albeit more indirectly, on future decision- making, even if one is never 
faced with the same choice again. Beike, Markman, and Karadogan (2009) argue 
that the paradigmatic case of experienced regret is one of missed or lost opportunity. 
They showed that people report the most intense regrets about choices that cannot 
be revisited, because as a result of making the initial choice, certain opportunities 
were lost and were lost irreversibly. Loss of opportunity in this sense could occur 
for both minor (e.g., deciding whether to buy a souvenir T- shirt in Disneyland) 
as well as major life choices (e.g., deciding whether to propose marriage), but may 
be particularly clear in the case of certain major life choices. To give an example, 
if one decides not to have children, for women at least there will come a point in 
their lives in which that choice cannot be reversed. In such circumstances, it is not 
possible for one’s regret to affect behavior through adaptive switching, because the 
option to switch is no longer available. Nevertheless, the fact that one experiences 
regret in the face of lost opportunities may have an impact on one’s future choices. 
Beike et  al. (2009, 395)  argue that “regretting lost opportunities reminds people 
not to lose out on other current opportunities. Hence, regret motivates people to 
seize the day.” If this is correct, experiencing regret about missed opportunities 
could have wide- ranging effects on subsequent choices, because when faced with 
another opportunity- providing choice, given one’s previous experience, one antici-
pates feeling regret about not taking up this option, and this informs one’s choice.
There are many other circumstances in which anticipated regret is likely to affect 
decision- making. Experimental studies on economic decision- making have dem-
onstrated that the anticipation of regret is one factor that shapes choice patterns, 
with people avoiding choices that are likely to lead to regret (e.g., Camille et al., 2004; 
Coricelli et al., 2005; Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 
1999). The general idea is that people try to minimize future regret by assessing the 
level of regret that might result from each choice and considering how likely it is that 
choices might result in such regret. There are influential formal models of economic 
decision- making that are based on this type of principle (Bell, 1982; Loomes & 
Sugden, 1982). Studies of economic decision- making in brain- damaged patients who 
have lost the ability to experience or anticipate regret indicate that a lack of regret is 
associated with poorer choice (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2007). The pow-
erful nature of anticipated regret has also been demonstrated in numerous studies 
in applied psychology, where levels of anticipated regret have been shown to be 
good predictors of subsequent health- related behavior and experimental manipula-
tions to induce anticipated regret have been demonstrated to impact on choice (e.g., 
with regard to deciding whether to use contraception [Richard, van der Plight, & 
DeVries, 1996], get a vaccination [Chapman & Coups, 2006], or take up smoking 
[Conner, Sandberg, McMillan, & Higgins, 2006]; see Koch, 2014, for review).
Viewed this way, regret can be seen to be a functional or useful emotion that 
helps guide better decision- making (Roese, 2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). 
Indeed, when questioned, people seem to value regret more than any other nega-
tive emotion because they believe it helps them to avoid repeating their mistakes 
and helps them to know how to act in the future (Saffrey et al., 2008). Although 
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research indicates that regret has a positive function, avoiding future regret turns 
out to be very important for one’s well- being, at least in the longer term. Research 
has also shown that high levels of lingering regret are associated with poorer men-
tal and physical health (Torges, Stewart, & Miner- Rubino, 2005; Wrosch, Bauer, 
Miller, & Lupien, 2007; Wrosch, Bauer, & Scheier, 2005). For example, Wrosch et al. 
(2005) found that among elderly adults, intensity of regret predicted higher levels of 
depressive symptoms, poorer physical health, and lower levels of reported life sat-
isfaction. These authors argue that when reflecting on how one’s life has unfolded, 
having long- standing regrets about the path one has chosen can be detrimental in 
measurable ways to one’s health (Wrosch et al., 2007).
3.  REGRET AND EPISODIC THINKING
The overall aim of this chapter is to explore whether we might come to a better 
understanding of how the possession of episodic memory can be seen to play a dis-
tinctive role in future- oriented decision- making by considering the role that regret 
has in decision- making. In section 2, we reviewed research that has demonstrated 
how regret, although an intrinsically backward- directed emotion, can nevertheless 
play an important role in future- oriented decision- making. Having established the 
importance of regret in this regard, we now need to consider how this emotion may 
depend upon episodic memory abilities. The thought that regretting something (or 
at least paradigmatic cases of doing so) involves episodic recollection may already 
be intuitive enough. But we think it is worth exploring in more detail just how 
exactly regret and episodic memory might be seen to be connected, as it may allow 
us to uncover how decision- making, too, might be seen to trade crucially on epi-
sodic thinking. We will do this in two stages. First, we will characterize the way of 
thinking about time that seems to be involved in both experienced and anticipated 
regret. Second, given this characterization, we will then consider how episodic 
memory plays a distinctive role in regret and, as a consequence, future- oriented 
decision- making.
3.1.  Ways of Thinking about Time and Regret
3.1.1. Experiencing Regret
Regret is by definition a counterfactual emotion: it depends upon counterfactual 
thought insofar as it involves looking back at a past decision that has led to a cer-
tain outcome and thinking about how one would have felt had one made a different 
choice. We can identify two important aspects of the way of thinking about time 
that is recruited in this sort of counterfactual thought. First, it seems to require 
an ability to consider two different temporal perspectives on the same point in 
time, where the relevant point in time is the point at which the choice was made. 
One of these is looking backward from one’s current location in time to the choice 
point. That choice is now in the past, and its consequences have become apparent. 
However, this is not all one is doing when one is experiencing regret: one is also 
thinking counterfactually about how things could have turned out differently. Such 
counterfactual thought seems to require being able, at least in principle, to think 
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back to a point in time when one was making a choice, but having made the choice 
was still in the future. From that alternative, temporal perspective, there were dif-
ferent options available to the decision- maker and it was not yet settled which one 
she would take. Experiencing regret seems to hinge on being aware of the availabil-
ity of these different options, which are now in the past but which were once pos-
sible ways the future could have unfolded, and a consideration of how they would 
have yielded alternative outcomes.
The second, related, aspect of this way of thinking about time that we want 
to emphasize is that it requires a capability to engage in what elsewhere we have 
described as “event- independent thinking about time” (McCormack, 2014, 2015; 
McCormack & Hoerl, 2008). What we are trying to capture by this term is the abil-
ity to think about particular times independently of the events that have occurred 
or that could occur at such times. A  spatial analogy is helpful in clarifying this 
notion. When we think of a place, we can think about it independently of the 
objects that occupy it. For example, we can think of “that place over there where 
my desk is” as remaining “that place” even if it was occupied by a different object 
or no object at all. That is, we can think about space in an object- independent way. 
Similarly, at least as mature thinkers, we can think about points in the past or the 
future as being distinct from any specific events that may have happened or will 
happen at those points in time. That is, we can think about particular times per se, 
rather than just being able to think about events.
The sort of counterfactual thought about the past that one engages in when expe-
riencing regret recruits event- independent thought about time. When one thinks 
back to the time before one’s choice was settled, in considering possible alternative 
courses of action one could have taken, one is able to think about the choice point 
as a location in time at which different events could have happened. Counterfactual 
thought of this sort is intimately connected to grasping that there are multiple pos-
sible ways in which events can or could have unfolded (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & 
Apperly, 2006). What we are arguing here is that such a grasp should also be seen 
as part of what it is to be able to think about time itself (for this argument in more 
detail, see McCormack, 2015).
Our purpose in unpacking the temporal abilities involved in experiencing regret 
is to demonstrate that there is a very robust sense in which regret might be said to 
involve mental time travel into the past. First, one needs to be able to, at least in 
principle, adopt a past temporal perspective at which having made one’s choice was 
still in the future, and the choice itself was as yet undecided. Second, it is genuinely 
a particular past time that the subject revisits in her thinking, in so far as the sub-
ject thinks of that time as one in which she made a particular choice, but does not 
think of the time just in terms of the choice she made them, but as one at which she 
could have made a different choice.
3.1.2. Anticipating Regret
In the previous section we mentioned the idea that decision- making can also turn 
on the anticipation of regret. That is to say, in some choices agents aim to minimize 
anticipated regret— they imagine looking back at their choice from a point of view 
later in time and thinking counterfactually about how they would have felt had 
they made a different choice. What they are concerned with is how they will look 
back on a decision that they have yet to take once the decision has been made and 
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they have to live with its consequences. Note that this type of thinking, too, can 
be seen to involve mental time travel in a very robust sense, albeit now into the 
future. Indeed, it is arguable that, because of the more complex temporal structure 
of the simulation it involves, anticipating regret more clearly involves mental time 
travel than the type of mental simulation described in section 1. In that section, we 
considered existing claims (e.g., those of Boyer, 2008) about how mental simulation 
may impact on decision- making about the future. The type of mental simulation 
that is invoked in that context is typically characterized as mental time travel from 
one’s present point in time to a future one at which the outcome of one’s choice will 
obtain (e.g., imagining a future reward, which may reduce temporal discounting). 
In fact, it is far from obvious how much of an understanding or reasoning specifi-
cally about time that type of simulation actually requires on the part of the subject. 
Indeed, as we have suggested, there is a sense in which the purpose of such simula-
tion is precisely to diminish the relevance of time, by allowing the subject to “pre- 
experience” the future outcome already, reducing subjective temporal distance to 
it, and forging a tighter connection between one’s present self and one’s future one.
Time itself, by contrast, plays a far more central role in the reasoning involved 
in anticipating regret, particularly with regard to the need to occupy a future per-
spective in time from which one is looking back at what will then be a potentially 
irrevocable decision, but is now an as yet undecided choice, and comparing the out-
come of that decision with the counterfactual outcome that would have obtained 
had one’s choice been different. It is again genuinely a different time the subject 
occupies in imagination in this type of reasoning, in virtue of the fact that this 
time is thought of in an event- independent way. That is to say, the imaginary future 
point of view occupied by the subject is conceived of as a time at which only one of 
the possible choice outcomes will obtain, but it is not thought of in terms of which 
such outcome will obtain, but as a time at which different outcomes may obtain, 
depending on the choice.
Thus, mental time travel abilities, both into the past and into the future, can be 
seen to play a crucial role in experiencing and anticipating regret. While anticipat-
ing regret involves future- directed mental time travel, though, and experiencing 
regret itself involves past- directed mental time travel, there is a backward- looking 
element that is an essential embedded ingredient in the future- directed thinking 
involved in anticipating regret. Because of this, we could say that anticipation of 
regret involves not just prospection (Buckner & Carroll, 2007)  but prospective 
retrospection.
3.2.  Episodic Memory and Regret
We have argued that there is a rich sense in which experiencing and anticipating 
regret involve mental time travel. However, what remains to be elaborated in more 
detail is how the ability to experience and anticipate regret depends essentially on 
memory that is specifically episodic, rather than some other type of memory or 
knowledge about the past gained in another way. As we mentioned earlier, it may 
seem intuitive that regret involves recollecting the past. Indeed, we think that it is 
highly likely that in many cases in which people experience regret, not only are they 
engaged in past- directed thought of the sort outlined earlier, but that episodically 
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remembering the past is a central ingredient of such thought. That is, although the 
past- directed thought must have a counterfactual aspect, episodically remember-
ing a past choice forms the backdrop for the associated counterfactual cognition. 
When we described the temporal structure of thought that seems to be involved 
in experiencing regret, we emphasized that it seemed to involve considering dual 
temporal perspectives: thinking of one’s choice as being in the past but also having 
an awareness that there was a time at which this was not yet the case and alterna-
tive choices could have been made. What is intuitively compelling about the idea 
that regret typically involves episodic recollection is that in regretting a choice one 
seems to be not simply retrieving information about a past choice, but mentally 
revisiting a previously occupied point in time and dwelling on the possibilities that 
existed when one actually occupied that temporal perspective. And it is this sort 
of revisiting of the past that usually held to be the preserve of episodic memory. 
Indeed, as we will describe in the following, recent neuroscientific research strongly 
suggests that episodic memory is typically involved in the sort of counterfactual 
thought about the past that features in regret.
Note, though, that we want to make a different (and in fact stronger) claim about 
the link between episodic memory and regret than simply that this type of memory 
normally is a central ingredient of regret. For a start, insofar as we are seeking a 
role for episodic memory to play, via its connection with regret, in future- directed 
decision- making, we are also interested in ways in which episodic memory might 
be seen to be involved in underpinning the capacity to anticipate regret,4 which 
we have argued plays an important role in such decision- making. Yet anticipating 
regret concerning a future decision cannot literally involve episodic recollection of 
that decision in the way that experiencing regret about a past decision can, and it 
is also not always a matter of recollecting past decisions of the same type, as we try 
to anticipate regret even when making entirely novel decisions. Moreover, even in 
the case of experienced regret, it is straightforward to think of instances in which 
one could regret a decision despite being unable to episodically remember making 
the decision itself. For example, you could switch on your computer in the morning 
to find out to your horror that in last night’s drunken stupor, you sent an inadvis-
able email to your boss. You could still engage in past- directed mental time travel 
in such an instance, and deeply regret the incident, but under such circumstances 
your past- directed mental time travel would be based on reconstruction rather 
than recollection of the past. Rather than arguing that all experiences of regret 
must involve episodically remembering the past, we want to instead claim that epi-
sodic memory underpins the very ability to engage in the ways of thinking about 
the past and the future required for regret (both experienced and anticipated). As a 
result, regret based on reconstruction of, rather than episodic memory of, the past 
must be parasitic or dependent on being able to experience regret as a consequence 
of episodic memory.
A related line of thought can be found in Bertrand Russell, who seems to be 
describing what nowadays would be called episodic memory when he says that 
“[i] t is obvious that we often remember what we have seen or heard or had other-
wise present to our senses, and that in such cases we are still immediately aware of 
what we remember, in spite of the fact that it appears as past and not as present” 
(Russell, 1912, 26). Russell then goes on to argue that “[t]his immediate knowledge 
by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past: without it, there 
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could be no knowledge of the past by inference, since we should never know that 
there was anything past to be inferred” (1912, 26). In short, his idea is that recog-
nizing that there is a past in the first place, portions of which we can reconstruct 
from information obtained in the present, presupposes having knowledge of at least 
some portions of that past that is not thus reconstructed, through (what would now 
be called) episodic memory. Thus, insofar as regret, too, can sometimes be based 
on reconstructing the past from present information rather than actually episodi-
cally recollecting the past, this, too, is only possible against a backdrop of episodic 
memory.
One way of understanding Russell’s argument here is in terms of an idea that 
Annette Baier (1976, 220) expresses by saying that “it is not an unimportant con-
ceptual truth that memory is of times, while knowledge is of facts, and that times 
cannot be discontinuous, as known facts can be disjoint.” As the context makes 
clear, the type of memory she has in mind here is, more specifically, episodic mem-
ory, which she explicitly contrasts with “the sort of human memory which is just 
information storage, just a capacity to regurgitate input” (1976, 219). The point she 
can be seen to be making is that an important dimension of the contrast between 
the two types of memory (which psychologists would call the contrast between 
episodic memory and semantic memory) is that, whereas the latter presupposes a 
separate understanding of whatever information is retained, and cannot explain 
such an understanding, the former can itself contribute to, or be a manifestation of, 
understanding— specifically an understanding of time itself as a domain in which 
the remembered events fall (see also Debus, 2013). It is this type of understanding, 
which we have also called event- independent thought about time, which also makes 
it possible for us to reconstructively populate the past with events we cannot actu-
ally remember and to think counterfactually about how, even though we did one 
thing at a certain point in the past, we could have done something else at the time.
Thus, the general claim about the connection between episodic memory and 
regret that we want to put forward is that, even though regret may sometimes occur 
in the absence of episodic memory for the particular past action that is its object, 
episodic memory has a key role to play in grounding the kind of understanding of 
time involved in regret (and also in anticipating regret). One way of understand-
ing this claim is as a developmental one— that episodic memory is required for the 
acquisition of the relevant understanding of time. But a stronger, constitutive, read-
ing of it is also possible— that is, that episodic memory abilities are also required to 
retain such an understanding. Whether it should only be understood in the former 
sense, or whether it can also be defended on the latter reading, is not our current 
concern (for a debate on this issue, see Hoerl, 1999, and Craver, 2012). Rather, we 
can ask whether, apart from the kinds of philosophical considerations mentioned 
earlier, there is also empirical support for the idea of a connection between episodic 
memory and regret of the general type we have suggested.5 As it turns out, there are 
several recent findings in psychology that at least point in such a direction.
In line with the suggestion that episodic memory and regret are closely linked, 
recent neuroimaging studies have indicated that episodic memory/ future think-
ing, and thinking counterfactually about a past event seem to depend, at least in 
part, on the same core network (often referred to as the Default Mode Network; 
see Schacter et al., 2012, for a review). This line of research has focused on what 
has recently been termed episodic counterfactual thinking (De Brigard, Addis, Ford, 
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Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard, Spreng, 
Mitchell, & Schacter, 2015), that is, counterfactual thinking that involves imagin-
ing how a specific episode in one’s personal past could have been different, which 
is the sort of counterfactual thinking that is central to the experience of regret. 
Recent fMRI studies indicate that there is significant overlap between the brain 
regions involved when participants are asked to episodically remember an event 
from their past and when they are asked to engage in the sort of upward episodic 
counterfactual thinking associated with regret (De Brigard et al., 2013; Van Hoeck 
et al., 2013; Van Hoeck, Ma, Van Overwalle, & Vandekerckhove, 2010; Van Hoeck, 
Watson, & Barbey, 2015). This overlap is particularly notable when the counterfac-
tual thinking involves imagining realistic alternatives to what actually happened 
to oneself (De Brigard et al., 2013) and is largely absent when the counterfactual 
thinking is impersonal (De Brigard et al., 2015). De Brigard et al. (2015) conclude 
from these studies that specifically episodic memory is typically heavily involved 
when thinking counterfactually about events in one’s own past. Indeed, De Brigard 
(2014, 177) has argued that “the very cognitive system by means of which we oper-
ate with mental contents about personal events that did happen also allows us to 
process mental contents about events [that] we think could have plausibly happened 
in our lives.”
Thus, recent neuroscientific evidence strongly supports the idea that there is a 
close link between episodic memory, counterfactual thinking, and regret, although 
of course evidence of this type is restricted to establishing correlations and leaves 
the precise nature of the relevant links between different cognitive abilities under-
determined. Interestingly, though, there is also some, albeit limited, empirical evi-
dence suggestive of the more specific claim that episodic memory is necessary for 
the capacity to experience regret. This emerges from the only attempt we are aware 
of to examine regret in amnesia. Craver, Kwan, et  al. (2014) interviewed K.  C., 
whom they described as “the definitive case of episodic amnesia,” about regret. 
What they showed was that K. C. had a good understanding of what regret was, in 
that he could give a generalized description of the nature of regret and the sort of 
things that might cause regret. Strikingly, though, K. C. was completely unable to 
describe any regrets that he had, and he was even unable to think of any regrets that 
anyone else (such as his mother) might have (see also Craver, Cova, et al., 2014). This 
is despite K. C. still possessing information about his past that remained intact in 
his semantic memory. Assuming that his responses to direct questioning provide 
reliable enough evidence, the case of K. C. thus suggests that, in the absence of epi-
sodic memory, individuals lack the mode of mental simulation that allows them to 
experience regret or even to imagine another’s regrets.6
So far, we have primarily considered how experiencing regret may require epi-
sodic memory. However, as we pointed out in section 2, regret has an important 
impact on future- oriented behavior, not just as a result of experiencing it, but as 
a result of anticipating it. Is it plausible to argue that episodic memory also plays 
a role in the anticipation of regret? The answer to this question depends on what 
is meant by “plays a role.” If what is meant is “plays a role developmentally,” then 
making such a case is straightforward: if episodic memory is required for experi-
encing regret, then insofar as anticipating regret depends developmentally on being 
able to experience it (and the evidence suggests that it does; McCormack & Feeney, 
2015), then episodic memory abilities are a developmental necessity for anticipated 
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regret. Note, however, that in addition to arguing that episodic memory might be 
developmentally necessary for experiencing regret, at the start of this subsection we 
also suggested that it is intuitively very plausible that when actually experiencing 
regret, one typically is engaging in recollection and thus recruiting episodic mem-
ory. As we have already pointed out, it is less straightforward to see how episodic 
memory may play a similar role in the anticipation of regret.
Again, one answer that one might give here is that retrieval of information from 
episodic memory is not the critical ability that is involved in anticipation of regret 
(although there may indeed be many occasions on which such memory retrieval 
informs the future simulation). Rather, it is the mode of thinking about time that is 
instantiated in episodic memory that is critical in the anticipatory case. As we have 
described it, the anticipation of regret has not only a forward- but also a backward- 
looking element: one is imagining oneself looking back on a decision that will be in 
the past, but is currently in the future. And insofar as this backward- looking ele-
ment of the simulation can be viewed as typically supplied by the episodic memory 
system, episodic memory processes can be seen to contribute to the anticipation of 
regret.
Finally, before leaving the issue of the connection between episodic memory and 
regret, it is worth considering further the different ways in which episodic memory 
might make its contribution depending on the nature of the regret. We pointed 
out in section 2 that regrets about missed opportunities may be particularly salient 
cases of regret (Beike et al., 2009). These are regrets that one cannot easily come to 
terms with because the previously presented opportunity no longer exists. What 
may be distinctive about such regrets is that on considering the missed opportu-
nity, one often regrets anew one’s choice, a process that re- involves episodic mem-
ory, at least in central cases. By contrast, experiencing regret regarding a repeatable 
choice can straightforwardly impact on decision- making without regretting anew. 
In the case of repeatable choices, it is plausible that, when faced with the same 
choice again, the most that memory need deliver is that one once came to regret this 
choice— information that could perhaps straightforwardly be supplied by semantic 
memory. It may even be the case that having experienced regret about a choice can 
affect one’s subsequent decision- making without one having to remember that one 
once regretted that choice. That is, experiencing regret may have led one to think of 
that type of choice as a poor one, and to avoid it subsequently, even if one no longer 
has any memory of the experience of regret itself (and, arguably, even if one cannot 
remember ever even facing such a choice before).
However, this cannot be the means by which regret about lost opportunities can 
have an impact on future decisions. As described in section 2, the impact of these 
sorts of regrets must be more indirect. By definition, one cannot be faced with 
exactly the same type of choice again. In the case of these lingering regrets, it may 
be that one re- engages in the same sort of mental time travel that resulted in regret 
in the first place, which we have already argued typically involves episodic recollec-
tion. Then the question is how regretting a lost opportunity anew, which recruits 
episodic memory, may impact on decision- making. It was suggested in section 2 
that, when faced with another opportunity- providing choice, one may anticipate 
regretting another sort of missed opportunity, and this may shape the choice that 
one makes. By this means, episodic memory can have a further, albeit more indi-
rect, input into anticipated regret.
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4.  BACK TO THE QUESTION OF FUNCTION
We started this chapter by raising the question of the evolutionary function of epi-
sodic memory: Of what adaptive benefit is it to us to be able to remember particular 
past events as such, given that those particular events will never come again? The 
way in which we have approached this question is by looking at ways in which epi-
sodic memory might have a distinctive role in decision- making. In particular, we 
have looked at the role of regret in decision- making, and the sophisticated capaci-
ties for mental time travel recruited in experiencing regret and anticipating regret. 
And we have discussed reasons for thinking that the ability to recollect past events 
in episodic memory underpins these capacities for mental time travel. We want to 
conclude this chapter by considering how exactly the arguments we have put for-
ward bear on the question of the evolutionary function of episodic memory itself.
It might perhaps be thought that showing how episodic memory underpins 
certain abilities recruited in particular forms of decision- making is sufficient to 
demonstrate how it can have an adaptive role. Yet, we have not quite closed the 
circle, as, in order to complete the answer about the evolutionary function of epi-
sodic memory, we also have to show that there are no other, considerably simpler, 
forms of decision- making processes that could essentially play the same role— in 
which case it is not clear why these specific ones have evolved— and also that the 
relevant forms of decision- making are in fact adaptive. These are the issues we want 
to address in what follows.
One type of decision- making that we have discussed turns on experienced 
regret. In section 2, we presented evidence that experienced regret has an influ-
ence on decision- making by facilitating adaptive switching. In a situation in which 
a subject has come to regret a particular type of choice they made in the past, this 
will lead them to avoid making the same choice again when encountering a choice 
situation of the same type in the future. There is a problem, though, with relying on 
this sort of case in framing claims about the evolutionary function of regret, and 
by extension of those of the episodic memory abilities that plausibly underpin the 
capacity to experience regret.
The problem here is somewhat similar to the problems we raised, in section 1, 
for attempts to frame claims about the evolutionary function of episodic memory 
more directly in terms of ways in which it might be involved in decision- making 
in situations in which the decision- maker has come across a choice situation of 
the relevant type before. In such choice situations, what is important is that past 
experience equips the subject with the means to know how to act next time she 
encounters a situation of the relevant type again. Of course, if the subject comes to 
regret having made the poor choice in the past, this can be one way for her to pos-
sess such knowledge. However, given the rather sophisticated cognitive capacities 
that we have argued are required to experience regret, and also given the emotional 
cost that feeling regret carries with it, even in situations in which it aids decision- 
making, it could be thought that this is a rather cost- intensive way of solving the 
problem of finding a way to learn from past experience how to make better deci-
sions in the future. Insofar as the function of regret in these sorts of cases is simply 
to make salient what the right choice is to make next time, it is not obvious that the 
backward- looking aspect of regret plays an essential role in them, and it is possible 
to think of other, less cost- intensive ways of solving that problem.7 It is therefore 
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difficult to argue that the function for which regret has evolved is primarily to aid 
decision- making in this type of situation.
This suggests that a better context within which to frame claims about the evolu-
tionary function of regret is in fact that of decision situations in which the subject 
faces choices of a type she has never made before. As we have argued, regret plays 
a role in such decision situations, too, because deliberation in such situations turns 
on minimizing anticipated regret. Yet here, too, it might in fact be thought that 
there is a particular kind of challenge that arises for the line of thought we have 
sketched, if it is to provide us a potential insight into functions for which particular 
cognitive capacities have evolved.8
Our suggestion has been that decision- making in the context of major life choices, 
in particular in cases in which the subject is faced with a choice of a type she has never 
faced before, often involves reasoning about anticipated regret. That is to say, the sub-
ject’s deliberations turn on whether, in looking back on her choice, she will come to 
feel regret when comparing it with the other choice(s) she could have made. Yet, it 
might be argued that it is hard to see why using such a decision- making procedure 
should be considered to be adaptive in the context of choice situations of a kind the 
subject has not encountered before— in particular, ones that involve potential choice 
options of a kind that the subject has never encountered before. This is because, in 
such a situation, the subject does not have enough to go on to figure out which choice 
she will in fact come to regret when comparing it with others, precisely because she 
has not been in the relevant situation before. Thus, if she comes to decide that she will 
regret certain choices more than others, there is an important sense in which that 
decision is not based on proper evidence, because she is not yet in possession of the 
relevant evidence that would allow her to make that decision (we will say more about 
this shortly). As such, there is no reason to think that using the decision procedure 
will reliably lead her to do what is in fact best for her— and it is therefore difficult 
to see how it could be adaptive. Indeed, it may be thought that using this decision 
procedure comes at a considerable cost, especially if the subject ends up pondering 
endlessly about whether or not she will come to regret her decision. Also, as we men-
tioned before, regret itself comes at a cost to one’s welfare, especially in situations in 
which the decision that subject feels regret about cannot possibly be reversed; thus, 
the realization that one might unwittingly make a choice that one will come to regret 
this way is also likely to impact negatively on one’s welfare to some extent.
One central ingredient in the line of thought just sketched has recently been dis-
cussed under the heading of transformative choice, where the claim has been made 
that choices of the kind just described, in which the subject faces the question as 
to whether she should make a decision of a type she has never made before, cannot 
be made rationally (Paul, 2014, 2015; Ullmann- Margalit, 2006). In particular, the 
argument has been that, whatever the decision- making processes involved in mak-
ing such choices, there is an important sense in which these processes are unable to 
yield a normatively correct answer as to which is actually the better choice for the 
subject to make, because one or more of the choices open to the subject is poten-
tially transformative.
L. A. Paul (2014) distinguishes in particular between two different ways in which 
choices can be transformative: epistemically transformative choices and personally 
transformative choices. In short, decisions can be epistemically transformative or 
personally transformative— and many major life decisions such as the decision to 
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have a child are arguably typically both— because experience can be epistemically 
transformative and personally transformative.
Experience can be epistemically transformative, because it can provide the sub-
ject with a type of knowledge that she could not possess before undergoing the 
experience— namely, what it is like for her to undergo the experience itself. The only 
way to acquire this form of knowledge is by actually undergoing the relevant form 
of experience onself (Jackson, 1982). An epistemically transformative choice, thus, 
is a choice where what is at stake is whether or not one should undergo an experi-
ence of a type one is not yet familiar with.
Experience can also be personally transformative; an individual can change 
as a person in response to experience, insofar as experience can change what her 
interests and values are. As a result, choices, too, can be personally transformative 
insofar as they are choices between options that may change the subject in this way. 
And the existence of personally transformative experiences also affects decision- 
making in a broader way. Even if personal transformation is not the object of one’s 
choice— that is, one’s decision is not between whether or not one should undergo 
a (potentially) personally transformative experience— the existence of personally 
transformative experiences can make it the case that one faces choices about out-
comes that one may come to view differently at the time because one’s interests and 
values have changed (Pettigrew, 2015).9
A key theme of Paul’s discussion of the nature of epistemically and personally 
transformative choices is that they imply that we are sometimes faced with choices 
in which at least one alternative, and sometimes each of them, constitutes, in an 
important respect, a step into the unknown. In both epistemically and personally 
transformative choice, we lack a crucial piece of information concerning the value 
we will attach to at least one of the outcomes we have to choose between: in epis-
temically transformative choice, we have not had the relevant experience before, 
and may be unable for that reason to determine how much we would value (or dis-
value) having it; in personally transformative choice, we may not lack any relevant 
knowledge about the outcome itself, but we do not yet know how much our choice 
will affect the extent to which we will value it.
The key distinguishing features of transformative choices, then, are that the sub-
ject faces a genuine choice, but also knows that she lacks a crucial piece of knowl-
edge about at least some of the outcomes she has to choose between, insofar as they 
involve situations of a type she has no experience of as yet, or insofar as her future 
self might attach different values to them than her present self does. In particular, 
as Paul argues, there is a distinctively first- personal aspect to the subject’s epis-
temic lack: she lacks a specific type of epistemic basis for judging what value she 
herself will attach to the relevant outcomes, because she has no prior experience of 
being in the types of situations they involve or cannot anticipate to what extent her 
own values may change as a consequence of her decision.10 As a result, she argues, 
a standard decision- theoretic model based on maximizing expected value cannot 
accommodate choices involving transformative experience— it provides no ratio-
nal means for the subject to make her choice.
The existence of transformative choices, then, may be thought to raise the follow-
ing problem for our overall argument. If it is right that certain options the subject 
must choose between in transformative choice situations are steps into the unknown, 
whose future value to her the subject has no rational way of assessing, it might seem 
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that whatever decision- making processes the subject uses in such choice situations 
will be unable to reliably (or even probabilistically) lead to an outcome that is in fact 
better for her, when compared with the other possible outcomes. And this general 
argument might be thought to apply also to the decision- making process we have 
sketched, which turns on reasoning about anticipated regret, as much as to any other 
process the subject might use in transformative choice situations. Thus, no reason for 
thinking that this type of decision- making process is adaptive has yet been given.11
In fact, though, we believe that the issues we have discussed are somewhat 
orthogonal to those at stake in Paul’s argument that, from a certain kind of norma-
tive perspective, transformative choices cannot be made rationally. It is important 
in this context to clarify that our claim is not that the decision- making processes 
that we have described, which turn on anticipating future regret, can somehow 
make up for the particular epistemic lack suffered by the subject facing transforma-
tive choices that Paul is concerned with. Within the context of the present chap-
ter, one way of describing Paul’s (2014) argument is in terms of the idea that the 
kind of decision- making based on simulation that we described in section 1 of this 
chapter is unavailable in the case of transformative choices, because the subject 
faces a choice of the relevant type for the first time. The difficulty, as she sees it, is 
that we are unable to judge what the subjective value of certain future outcomes 
may be to us, if they involve unfamiliar, transformative experiences. In section 3, 
we described a different, rather more sophisticated form of simulation centered on 
anticipating regret. In doing so, however, we did not mean to suggest that this form 
of simulation can somehow solve the problem Paul says cannot be solved using 
the simpler type of simulation when we are dealing with a case of transformative 
choice. In an important sense, that problem remains. What we are suggesting, in 
some sense, is that the more sophisticated form of simulation may be seen to help 
the subject come to a decision despite it.
But this still leaves the question as to how the ability to anticipate regret might 
be adaptive in the case of transformative choices, despite not being able to remove 
the epistemic lack that subjects face in those choices, that is, the fact that she cannot 
as yet know what value she will assign to at least some of the outcomes she has to 
choose between. We want to end with three brief and admittedly speculative com-
ments on this issue.
First, while the ability to anticipate regret cannot make up for the epistemic lack 
involved in facing transformative choices, it plausibly plays a key role in one’s being 
able to appreciate and take account of their potentially transformative character 
in the first place. Transformative choices carry the risk that one may end up with 
an outcome one is not happy with but which one cannot make undone, and regret 
about past such outcomes or about lost opportunities can alert one to the possibil-
ity of one’s choice having such consequences again in the future. Appreciating the 
irrevocability of certain choices (Hoerl, 1999; Ullmann- Margalit, 2006), and of the 
effect they may have on oneself, can clearly be beneficial, for instance in the context 
of the thought that one is not ready to make the decision to have a child, because 
one’s life situation is not yet settled enough to cope with some of the more stressful 
or negative experiences associated with having a child.
Second, awareness that a choice is potentially transformative, and that one may 
live to regret it, may also lead one to seek more third- person information about the 
extent to which others who have made the relevant choice have come to value their 
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decision. While third- person information may not conclusively allow the subject 
herself to settle how she herself may feel upon making the relevant type of choice, it 
may at least increase her confidence as to whether or not that choice will be the right 
one for her to take as well (Dougherty, Horowitz, & Sliwa, 2015; Pettigrew, 2015). 
Note further that the decision- making process that we have described, which turns 
on anticipating regret, might also explain in this context how the subject’s decision 
can be first- personal while being based on such third- person information. (Paul 
[2014] describes this as the question as to how decisions in the context of transfor-
mative choice can be authentic.) A concern with future regret, that is, might help 
explain how a subject can choose a certain future course of action for herself, even 
though doing so constitutes a step into the unknown for her, whose actual effect 
on her she is unable to predict, and all she has to go on in judging that it will be 
the right course of action is the testimony others have given her of their own cases.
Finally, a focus on how decision- making in the context of transformative choice 
is bound up with the ability to anticipate regret might also provide for a way of 
recognizing a benefit in transformative choice itself. Animals and young children 
presumably undergo experiences that are epistemically transformative for them, 
or that transform them as individuals. Yet, it is less plausible to think that this is 
something they make choices about as such (rather than it occurring as a mere 
consequence of their other choices). As adults, however, we do sometimes con-
sciously seek out new experiences or personal transformation, even while knowing 
that doing so constitutes a step into the unknown. Moreover, there seems to be a 
particular kind of value that we attach to the very idea of having new experiences or 
doing something for the first time, rather than simply doing things we are already 
familiar with. As we mentioned earlier, for instance, the kinds of choices people 
seem to regret most take the form of lost opportunities. And while it is of course 
right that consciously seeking out new experiences and challenges may not always 
produce the best result for us (indeed, as we said two paragraphs ago, it carries with 
it specific risks), the fact that we can and value doing so is arguably part of what 
explains the vast gulf between the kinds of learning abilities that we find in animals 
and the distinctive way in which humans are able to take active control of their lives 
and their own acquisition of knowledge.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Felipe De Brigard and an anonymous reviewer for very helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this chapter. Part of the first author’s work on this 
chapter was carried out within the context of the Spanish Government project no. 
FFI2012- 35153, and the chapter was also supported by ESRC grant number ES/ 
K000411/ 1 to the second author.
NOTES
 1. We will say more about this understanding of regret as an emotion directed at 
choices. Also, we will focus specifically on regret, as regret can be seen to play a 
particularly prominent role in decision- making. However, for other purposes it 
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might be useful to think of regret as just one example of a broader set of similarly 
structured emotions with both a backward- looking and a counterfactual ingredi-
ent, of which relief is also a member.
 2. On similar grounds, Zentall, Clement, Bhatt, and Allen (2001) argue that tasks 
that require extensive prior training are unsuitable for demonstrating the exis-
tence of episodic memory in animals.
 3. The alternative possibility is that the correct description of such patients is that 
they cannot properly imagine the future, and Boyer is wrong in claiming that 
mental time travel can moderate temporal discounting. Craver, Kwan, Steindam, 
and Rosenbaum (2014) argue for this interpretation.
 4. We will say more about the relevance of this for our overall argument in section 4.
 5. What we know about development is clearly consistent with at least the develop-
mental reading of the claim mentioned earlier: children do not seem to be able to 
experience regret until around 5– 6 years (O’Connor, McCormack, & Feeney, 2012; 
O’Connor et al., 2014; Weisberg & Beck, 2012), and cannot anticipate regret until 
around 8 years (McCormack & Feeney, 2015). Thus, these abilities emerge at a time 
when episodic memory abilities are already intact and robust. However, given the 
sophisticated temporal and counterfactual reasoning abilities involved in regret, 
it is unsurprising that it is a relatively late developing emotion, which makes it 
hard to argue for any more specific link with episodic memory on the basis of the 
developmental evidence.
 6. Craver, Cova, et al. (2014) demonstrate that K. C. is susceptible to a particular type 
of effect in economic decision- making (the Allais paradox) that has been previ-
ously been explained in terms of anticipated regret (Loomes & Sugden, 1982). One 
interpretation of this finding is that K. C. can in fact anticipate regret, even though 
he does not seem to experience it. Such an explanation is broadly compatible with 
the recent suggestion that the anticipation of regret may involve different brain 
regions from the experience of regret, and that the former can be intact even in 
the absence of the latter (Levens et al., 2014). However, Craver, Cova, et al. (2014) 
instead suggest that regret- based explanations of the paradox must be incorrect.
 7. It is of course still true that regret, with its counterfactual element, provides for a 
less cost- intensive way of learning from past experience than even simpler ones, 
because it makes salient not only that one’s choice was a poor one, but which 
alternative choices might have been better. In the absence of such counterfactual 
thought, learning may be slower, as it might be necessary to actually try out each 
of the alternatives one by one. This is one reason that counterfactual thought is 
often assumed to be particularly beneficial in correcting suboptimal behavior (see 
Epstude & Roese, 2008, for more detailed discussion of the adaptive benefits of 
counterfactual thinking).
 8. See also Schacter et  al. (2015, 20), who, immediately after stating that “[b] oth 
“prefeeling a possible future scenario and reminiscing about foregone past choices 
could […] provide motivational incentives that foster more farsighted decisions” 
(in contrast to decisions driven by more immediate interests), go on to point out 
that “this mechanism need not always enhance the probability of making choices 
that are [in fact] beneficial in the long run.”
 9. This latter issue is less prominent in Paul’s own discussion of transformative expe-
rience, and we will also largely set aside in what follows. There are in fact two 
different issues that decision- makers face in this situation: first, they may not be 
able tell to what extent their interests and values will change; but even to the extent 
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that they are able to do so, they face the question of which set of values they should 
choose to evaluate the desirability of the outcome.
 10. Most of the existing critical responses to Paul’s argument, in one way or another, 
target this element of her argument, and the implication that transformative 
choices pose problems separate from those involved in decision- making under 
other forms of uncertainty. The suggestion, in short, is that while testimony from 
others or observational knowledge of other’s behavior who are in the kind of 
situation envisaged may not provide conclusive evidence about what things will 
be like in one’s own case (because of what Paul refers to as the reference class 
problem), they can provide some evidence— and in this the choice situation is 
no different in kind from other choice situations in which we have only limited 
information about the likely outcomes of our actions. We will leave this issue to 
one side.
 11. Note that the argument described in this paragraph is not one Paul herself makes. 
We are just describing one way in which one might think her argument bears on 
our position.
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